Kant’s “Third Critique” and the Adjacent Possible.

Alex Cantarelli

(May 2017)

1. Kant’s “Third Critique”.
2. Art and science.
3. Analogy, homology.
4. Kant and Stuart Kauffman’s Adjacent Possible.

 

1. Kant’s “Third Critique”

In 1790, Immanuel Kant published the "Critique of Judgment"1, a work that actually closes the triad of complex works of Kantian maturity. The Third Critique, in fact, has always been a little intercepted by both philosophical historiography and subsequent theoretical speculation. The reasons for this sub-dimensioning of the scope of the work are many.
Meanwhile, the enormous hermeneutic effort of the interpreters of the First Critique should be figured. This appears to be complete in itself and exhaustive. The Second Critique deals with the regularity of moral ideas and therefore the Critique of Judgment in the end appears to be a sort of "element in addition". For some, Kant had simply kept his object of artistic experience out of his multi-year analysis. And here it is integrated. That’s it, back to square.
But as often happens, the fortune of a work and its relevance are not immediately visible. Interpreters are often reluctant to reconsider the systematic nature of the “Pure Reason”. Yet it is precisely this: the Third Critique is not a completion of the critical Kantian philosophy but its re-thinking. First, it is to be understood that Third Critique is not a book about art or the nature of organisms or anything else. This is not a "special" analysis. It's a Critique, like the First Critique. And this uniformity of intentions that the main term of the title exuded must alert us.

I started, in this analysis, with a simple question: why does Kant group in the same text two so apparently distant subjects such as the aesthetics and the finality of nature, or to be more general, art and biology?
The question is, of course, not very original, nor does it expect to be. However, over time I have accumulated curious answers, which deserve, in my humble opinion, a clarification.
The interpretative proposal of a field of philosophical historiography is strongly conditioned by the will (I would say rather anti-Kantian) to let survive the first two “Critiques” in the third. Some interpreters consider the Third Critique as a "synthesis" of the two previous ones. But such “synthesis” is an anachronistic concept for Kant. In synthesis, the synthesized elements survive. This concept is misleading. Third Critique does not want to survive anything. It is overcome, i.e., from within, in its development. In fact, I want to show that Third Kantian Critique is not ancillary to the first two, but it completes them, even though it partially unknowingly rejects them. It is, in its editorial form, "victim" of its own proposition. Let it fall, at its passage, all the superstructures that would render it useless and pleonastic. Finally, he realizes the theoretical core that is his basic need: to explain how it is possible for the intellect, to "imagine" and to prevent knowledge.

It has often been said of the Third Critique as a forerunner of romanticism and idealism. For this reason, it is treated as the latest Mozart’s quartets, more romantic than the early works of Beethoven. But the reason for this is not it has introduced a "feeling"2 into the theory of knowledge, but rather in having subjected freedom to knowledge. In Third Critique, as Emilio Garroni3 has brilliantly urged, the experience as a whole, which transcends the limits of experience, is fluttered and reported within the limits, though constructive and constantly creative, of the experience itself through the work of a new faculty of Judgment, the reflective faculty4. With it, entirety and multiplicity of nature is "intuited" and the subject moves in the search, even imagining and reconstructing, awaiting verification, the non-actual or simply recommended sensitive information. This is the meaning of the inclusion of the super-sensible in the sensible: not in actuality, but in power, transcendental is revealed in the empirical5.
Kant introduces a new universal knowledge of the world: the Reflective Judgment, or reflective capacity of Judgment. It uses the "feeling of pleasure" (“das Gefühl der Lust”). Reflective Judgment harmonizes with the laws of the intellect, which are functional in a double key. They give to the object specificity, describe it, and in addition, they are the ontological guarantee of this latter. We could imagine two cognitive "movements", one of the "gathering" of information ("Reflective Judgment") and one of the organization of the known ("determinant judgment" or the pure laws of the intellect). The vital lymph of knowledge, going to seek the new beyond the limits of the present experience, is the feeling of pleasure; without this “motivation", no knowledge would be possible. In fact "the most common experience would not be possible without it (the pleasure)”6. The "most common experience" then. Not the aesthetic or teleological experience. But every experience. The Reflective Judgment opens to Kant the horizon of meaning, dominating more than any other feature of the intellect. We could say, paraphrasing, that the intellect without the sensible intuition is empty, the sensible intuition without intellect is blind and both without Reflective Judgment are immobile. collaborano in ogni atto conoscitivo, in un gioco libero. L’intelletto categorizza ma non può non servirsi delle ipotesi immaginative che il soggetto elabora a partire dal dato sensibile.
The reflective capacity of Judgment thus appears to be a kind of constructive and imaginative capacity that allows us to go beyond the data to reconstruct the genesis, or the whole, or the system. Research itself, human capacity to foresee, hypothesize, or to transcend data, are based on the reflective capacity of Judgment. This ability moves in collaboration with the categories of the intellect, with space and time, but does so by not a logical principle but by a "feeling of pleasure". As a "food" of cognitive research, Kant then puts the "feeling of pleasure or displeasure". This feeling is subjective, which means ”right of each", yet it is universal as it presupposes a "sensus communis", or a "universal state of communication of the state of mind in the representation given"7, of which pleasure is the consequence. It is this feeling at the basis of our ability to imagine a connection between elements not simultaneously present. In this feeling, so to speak, there is time, space and freedom. The Determinant Judgment, that is, the ability to categorize the data of experience, "plays" together with the Reflective Judgment, in the elaboration of experience. The intellect itself is incomplete, needs orientation, foreseeing, imagination. This "free play of the faculties" is an indispensable aesthetic character of experience not only the artistic one, since Kant is clear that it does not concern the aesthetic experience in particular, but through it, as an exemplary experience, the mechanism is extended to experience in general. Cognitive faculties, imagination and intellect, are among them in a "free play, since no particular concept limits them to a particular cognitive rule."8 They collaborate in each cognitive act in a free play. Intellect categorizes but can not fail to use the imaginative hypotheses that the subject processes from the sensitive data. The aesthetic experience is "exemplary" precisely because through it, you can understand the "free play" in its mechanism.
In this “free game” there is all the rethinking of the two previous Critiques. The First Critique, since no categorical scheme can ever move alone in the indefinite search field. The Second Critique, because freedom leaves the exquisite moral field to emerge and integrate fully in the mechanism of knowledge and of "staying in the world". In fact, the reflective capacity of Judgment is already contained in its freedom. It does not appeal to super-sensible freedom. Research itself is free. Freedom that appears to be postulated as the principle of every possibility of experience is, so to speak, overcome from within. If we have the reflective capacity of Judgment, or the ability to imagine a universal from particular data, then moral freedom does not serve us for the experience. Freedom, as a moral ambition, falls within the same statute of knowledge as implicit in the search that opens in every cognitive act that uses the reflective faculty of Judgment. It would therefore be a sort of metaphysical revision which, while on one hand remains implicit and little aware, on the other hand it remains unheeded by the interpreters.
Through the introduction of the reflective faculty of Judgment there is a sort of internal collapse of schematism, time, and freedom. Reflective Judgment is, in all respects, the instrument of knowledge. It collaborates with the rules of the intellect, and it uses them. They are not, however, its principle. The experience of artistic or biological finality, established on the "feeling of pleasure or displeasure", actually opens the experience to freedom that is not a moral idea, but an impossibility to predetermine the content of the experience and the consequent desire for research.
I would suggest an “implicitation” of freedom into the pleasure of knowledge and of an unnecessity in the horizon of cognitive choices.
Imagine an individual seated on a spinning wheel. In every angle, the man has a chance to have an experience, for example he can see an object. He has only one chance, he can stop when he wants to stop the wheel and start over again. His stopping the wheel is not “freedom”. He is moved by the will to know the objects. He will not stop twice at the same object, unless it has already forgotten it. But even in this case the system does not change. The free gesture is free-to know.
Freedom as a chance is founded on the search that satisfies the feeling of pleasure. Every object of knowledge is actually possible and the subject is free. If knowledge is conceived as a possibility, freedom collapses on it. In Third Critique, far from seeking a foundation of knowledge in the super- sensible, a common ground is introduced which has a new founding principle. It is the reflective faculty of Judgment.


2. Art and Science.

The subjectivity of the imagination does not create a "private judgment". Kant uses an apparent oxymoron to justify this impasse: he uses the notion of universal subjectivity, a single judgment criterion, but which, however, still awaits, and obtains, a universal approval. In this sense, the object of art is an exemplary object of this universalization, implemented without any concept, experience and judgment. The work of art is judged (not "judged beautiful", but only judged) from subjective rules that claim universality. As a basis for it, a "sensus communis aestethicus", an “unspoken”, i.e. a common judging situation, as a foundation of its communicability.
According to Kant, not the pure artistic experience but the experience in general requires an agreement between the faculties of knowledge, imagination and intellect. They act in every experience by agreeing to a "free game of faculties". This "freedom" to agree is not a "free choice" of the individual, but an inexpressible characteristic of knowledge in general, its indeterminacy, an "artistic" character of experience, in all its forms and under each species. "Free" here means "indefinite and creative". Or even "hypothetical", or rather, "which generates hypothesis". Kantian aesthetics is a non-aesthetic, or as brilliantly proposed by Emilio Garroni, a "non-special philosophy"9. At a distance of years since that revelation, we can try to reinterpret everything, making yield the seed of that vision.
The Critique of Judgment, as we have said, deals with the aesthetic experience and devotes a long second section to the "teleological" Judgment, as the possibility of knowing a finality of nature, thus implicitly highlighting the question of which the thematic unity of Critique of Judgment should be. In fact, understanding this unity is understanding everything.
The teleological Judgment first compensates for a lack of the principles of the intellect. The imaginative hypothesis of a nexus finalis in facts of nature allows the intellect a sort of compensation, enabling it to formulate hypotheses in the field of a research. The principle of finality is in fact the “switch” of knowledge. The classic principle of the "nexus effectivus" is actually descending. It goes from the effect to the cause. How can one find a law that allows you to find a "nexus finalis" in the experience? Understanding finality allows you to proceed from the cause to the effect.
Whether Kant finds himself, for consistency’s sake, in dealing with teleological Judgment, or if it is his own judgment to open the door to an aesthetic analysis, we do not know.
Investigating the finality in nature, Kant faces the experience of biological organisms. In Kant’s mind, organisms are a crack of mechanism.
So a sort of biological-specific looks out onto his non-specialist thought - if nothing else, a more general methodological point of view.
To think that the rules of the intellect alone can guide us into the whole of the experience is wrong. For the intellect there are causal but logical connections based on the determinant Judgment. Through the intellect we can reconstruct a casualty, in fact it is a category of relationship. But the intellect alone is not enough in the case of the experience of a system, or of various elements to which a mutual relationship must be attributed.
Kant is adamant: finality of nature can not be explained in final terms, since no finalism can be attributed to the field of experience, nor in mechanistic terms. Mechanism indeed confuses the "formal" finality with the "real" finality. Only the latter is based on the intellect and its rules. Rules, however, which are insufficient to understand and classify a multitude of experiences.
The Reflective Judgment then runs to aid the intellect, it supports its functions, as a "rational regulatory principle". The whole for Kant is always regulatory and never constitutive. Kant does not even say that finalism is impossible. Only we can not have any knowledge of it. Teleology therefore does not introduce a new concept of finality, but introduces a new capacity for judgment, which allows us to "compensate for the deficiency of the mechanical laws in the same empirical research of all the special laws of nature."10 The admission of an intellect's ability to reason in a reflective, regulatory manner regarding the finalities of nature, allows us to mediate every systematic knowledge, including apparently different and dissimilar data. Imagination therefore allows the reconstruction of a finality that is not in nature but in our ability to judge. Organizations, or those particular bodies to know which are required to pre-view the whole of the individual parts, are an exemplary experience: they allow us to search for and infer from the existence of an regolative Judgment, which leads us to an "informal conversational nature (aesthetic-intellectual) virtually indisposable by sciences."11
Here is the connection reconstructed. The fundamental reason why Kant combines in one publication a research on art and one on biology is not analogous to the objects of these two domains but to the common aspect of the application of the same principle of Judgment. That is the regulatory principle of reflective Judgment, a subjective, indisputable artistic principle. The analogy between art and science is based then on the nature of the application of the same faculty of judgment.


3. Analogy, homology.

What is this ability to make predictions, or to settle for the unpredictability of the data? Orienting into a complex system means accepting a partiality of determinism, which is to say that we must accept a non-determinism. What is this capacity and this "patience" in enduring the incompleteness of system resolution?
We have seen that in the Kantian perspective, the reflective Judgment allows us to know "delaying the conclusions". This ability is a characteristic of artistic, concrete experience or both of the trivial and of the strictly scientific experience, i.e. experience in general.
When an electron "decides" its spin, it performs an act that can not be identified by mechanical rules, but which would seem to imply a choice. Conway and Kochen's theorem12 is, according to the same authors, "provocative"13; but actually it proceeds from the assumption of a homology between environments - observers, electrons. The two domains shall be subject to the same rules and must be considered, at least and as far as the problem is concerned, homologous.
What is a homology? I define a homologous environment, the Q environment, whose elements α1...αn can be attributed to all the characteristics attributed to the elements of another P group. Homology, in this purely geometric way, projects from one environment to another its characteristics to objects, so that there is a proven and not just analogous relationship between the two domains14.
From the point of view of the Kantian Transcendental (categories, pure principles of the intellect) we have an absolute homology of environments: every object that has specific characteristics finds its ontological reason in the same categories or pure schemes of the intellect. There is, in fact, no problem of homology between different systems of nature, but an absolute homology between a sensible world and an intellect is postulated, which is inferred from the guarantee of one's existence in the other.
However, if we think of analogy (a term that takes very similar meanings in the various scientific domains) we are designating a symbolic or functional approach that compares a series of similar features in different entities. This function, for Kant, is implemented by the imagination that sustains the Judgment of a reflective type.
We might wonder why we have the need to find analogies between different ontological environments (man, animal, electron). The “analogue demand” arises from a need of knowledge. Developing a "similar" model means having an understanding tool of a different scope. But why not leave each scope with its own characteristics? Why this need of applying foreign models? Does the application of extraneous templates fail in solving problems?
Let's take the example of the "conscience" of the electron: if I give to all the objects of a set the same characteristics I can say that every object of that set satisfies a certain function. For example, if I can promote a child to a superior class for being able to make an addiction, this rule must be valid for all children: if a child can do an addiction he can be promoted. Can I apply the same procedure for an elephant or an electron? I do not think so. Yet if an elephant knew how to make an addiction I should not only create a second class of elephants, but I should also admit the existence of an homology between the two sets, namely set of men and set of elephants. I must be able to say that men and elephants have the same characteristics as regards the ability to make additions. The same happens in the case of the attribution of "consciousness" to a subatomic particle, an electron. His "choice" to move in one direction or another is a function of his ability to choose.
Between the electron and the human conscience, then, does an analogy or system homology exist? Does freedom of choice for the human being depend on his actual freedom or on the high degree of complexity of conditioning? (Electron: state one; man, state complex).
But Conway's and Kochen's Theorem does not pretend to admit the full psychological or gnoseological characteristics of a conscience. It merely says, absurdly, a seemingly impossible but converging homology, with regard to the characteristic of choosing the subject of the investigation. Similarly is made by Roger Penrose's "Orchestrated Object Reduction" model. It assumes an internal- neuronal model by making homologues in fact the neurons themselves, and the meaning that neuron operations in their entirety do. A sort of internal homology, then15.
Many experiments are carried out to confirm the model, which by now remains a "model", or an imaginative hypothesis in need of confirm which owes its processuality to the functions of the intellect, i.e. to the ability of the latter to generate projective models that need afterward an experimental confirmation. In this virtuous circle the reflective, a-dogmatic and open possibility of reusing the available data to formulate new hypotheses is well present and active.
The parallel based on homology is always a hypothesis to be confirmed. If it becomes definitive, as in the case of "Free Will Theorem”, if it loses the "projection" characteristic of a hypothesis that inherits its characteristics from a different field (e.g. subatomic physics from psychology or knowledge theory) it becomes absolute losing maybe any statute of accuracy. Consciousness is not a possibility of choice but a possibility of choice according to motivation. Consciousness does not end with the freedom of choice.
If we start from the features or functions of different entities and assign a name, a unique feature to that function or set of functions (e.g. "choice" is the characteristic of consciousness) we can say that the electron has a consciousness. But in any case, we believe it is necessary to establish a homology of systems for which the characteristics of the human system can be reported as subatomic or animal or micro-cellular systems.
One might imagine a kind of annulment of homology. In fact, the Transcendental, the condition of knowledge, for Kant, must not be confused with a mental process. It does not have a placement (for example, the human brain) because the same position would, in turn, be subject to the same conditions of knowledge. The Transcendental, whether it is a category and therefore a "determinant" Judgment, or the feeling of pleasure, so reflective Judgment, or “Proportion", a free play of all the mechanisms of knowledge, - is ontological. It's a key to repositioning the Being. This because it is a linguistic stratagem that allows us to circumscribe the sphere of pure knowledge and to reposition its limits: the limits of Being, because the Transcendent has nothing to do with the mechanisms of knowledge but with the very Being of the entities. Entities are not "known" but "exist" through the Transcendental.
There is an imaginary component in the cognitive experience that proceeds from analogy. At the time of formulating a theory, either right or wrong, that was the best possible theory at that time from the elements already acquired. But what did that theory produce? What is the engine that drives the human being to formulate a better theory? It is the preventive non-objective orientation of reflective Judgment.
How do you think a hypothesis? The hypothesis is a prediction that hypothesizes a systemic homogeneity between reality and its symbolic description. How can we advance a hypothesis? We do this formally based on the condition of the reflective faculty of judgment, by creating similar contents. reflective Judgment is form, analogy the matter.
We can think about so-called "mental experiments", experiments that imply the construction of impossible verification models (from “Achille and Turtle” to the Einstein’s "Relativity train" down to “Wittgenstein's Beetle”). In this impossibility lies the imaginative, orienting, preliminary characteristic of the reflective faculty of judgment. Through it, the “purely mental" model receives, in conjunction with the laws of the intellect, its ontological, predictive and functional status. The same Theoretical Physics, (in an almost oxymoron), uses an imagination to which totality is a precondition (imagined and not in effect)16.
The unpredictability of quantum mechanics is well suited to describe the Kantian mechanism "free play of faculties". For example: what would Kant say of the “Uncertainty principle” or of “Wave– particle duality”?
He might say that in the case of Heisenberg's uncertainty, the reflective Judgment deceives. It expects to find the object of the experience but the latter is other than he predicted. First, it must be said that if an experimental rule is rejected, i.e. if the electron is not "in its place”, it is because who is seeking it is moving by following a rule. Any rejection of determinism assumes transcendental determinism, a desire for consistency through laws.
Presuming, though provocatively, a liberty, of which we only verify the result, that is, non-location, means to implement a cognitive process that assumes finality17.
But the same inclusion of the possibility of a non-total predictability of the phenomenon, the pursuit of the research despite the unpredictability, is a characteristic, we may say, all based on the reflective faculty of Judgment and on the principle of “free play” between imagination and intellect. An unexpected prediction, which becomes the only possible law, would not be even remotely understandable by intellect alone, which go through determinant subsumption and rules. What the intellect would call a mistake for reflective Judgment is, however, a possible data of research. In some ways quantum mechanics would thus confirm Kantian intuition.


4. Kant and Stuart Kauffman’s “Adjacent Possible”.

Philosophy is ontology. It can handle everything, it might have the tools, but its exclusive object is Being. Each field of science, and every field of research, may even share, with philosophy, objects and objectives. But every philosophical search is also always a search for Being. Being is inalienable of philosophical research. And it can not be the subject of research in other fields. They need to degrade Being to another necessarily different and reduced, and all this in order to understand it.
Husserl "realizes" Kant's reflective Judgment, as an ability to judge preventively and actively. Husserl’s theory of knowledge is in fact a knowledge of essences, which show themselves through phenomena. Consciousness is "intentional", or it is always consciousness-of something. In this sense, the reflective capacity of judgment as an act that put in relation the whole of the previously given experiences, seems to be so kindred to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, that this latter must be considered as a fulfillment of the former.
The relation between Kant and Husserl, never as explicit as the theoretical one that Husserl settled with Descartes, are very strong and deserve a deeper discussion apart. In any case, the "claim of objectivity" is a path that Kant faces without a paradox, virtuous but always paradoxical: to get to know things, one has to move away from things. For this reason, talking about an unknowable noumenical reality (Kant) and a phenomenological epochè (Husserl) is exactly the same thing. In both cases, without the experience, there would be no ontology. The experience is and remains the ontological guarantee18.
Moreover, the "quantum" of Husserl's experience is “meaning”, a discrete unity that puts us in the state of understanding. Perception is the perception of essence, because data unification takes place immediately in the experience. The reduction of phenomenology is, according to Husserl, in every experience and every object, except for the consciousness itself: it is "pure" or "transcendental", the term Kantian par excellence19.
What occurs as an experience is caught by the intellect (or “cogito” by Husserl) by its very own feature of being an intellect. It is an intellect never at rest, but always animated by its basic principle, which leads the intellect to seek beyond the limit of the data in the direction of essence, or of totality, or systematicity20. As if there was no limit.
The concept of limitation is indeed problematic. Limit is the set of acquired knowledge, but nevertheless among the acquired knowledge there is also the awareness that the set of known data is by definition unfinished. Rather than defining the limits of knowledge, the rule, of opening the system and the inclusion of new content, should be defined.
The concept of "Adjacent Possible" by US biologist Stuart Kauffman21 would explain this to us: the knowledge system, or the biosphere, or the vast multitude of becoming transformed entities, is constantly growing from elements already present in the system, to which other purposes are related. Every evolutionary element is already in itself present to the totality of the entities, so to speak, under false pretenses. The constant search for improvement of biological and intellectual conditions clarifies us that what we need is already within reach22.
The example he makes, admittedly trivial, of possible uses of a "screwdriver" is illuminating. The possible uses of the object are indefinite, can not be exhausted. Indeed, moreover, they arise in interaction with objects or situations that did not exist before23. "The becoming of the biosphere is in large part the becoming of new, unprestatable functions.”24
Thinking about the Kantian Transcendental, the Adjacent Possible is not (in Kauffman’s opinion) a law of the intellect but a true objective law of nature. It brings together in the same system observer and observed and, together with them, every entity or organism of the biosphere.
It is not a quantitative but a qualitative law. It does not define how much “adjoining” is the possibility into the system already given. But implicitly it defines that every new behavior comes from a resetting of the functions already given.
The Adjacent Possible is then a law of objects or a law of thought about objects? Or both the law of nature and the law of thought submit to the same Transcendental? I.e. can Adjacent Possible be an element of "logical synthesis" between the nature of matter and the Transcendental that understands it? Or is it still the same Transcendental, as nature is, evolving and therefore submitted to the same laws?
Let’s go back to the aesthetic thematics: promoting a "novelty" in fields such as art, novelties in any form, is a very common fact. But it is understandable only if it refers to a prior technique through which it can be understood. A novelty, too far from the system I already acquired, would seem incomprehensible. We might hypothesize that it is adjacent to another S1 system in some way or in any way related to S.
Here, in this case, the Adjacent Possible works only if all the fields of operativity are not defined once and for all. Let's take the example of Duchamp's "ready made". The system of common objects was related to that of art objects and its novelty was not adjacent to the system of the latter. The adjacency was between the systems, not between the objects.
In the construction of a theoretical model, we use analogous images, which are often taken from different domains than that of the phenomenon itself. The ability to reuse elements already given in nature or in art to justify research models is an obvious way of re-using elements, a feature of the Adjacent Possible. An element α that is part of the P system is integrated into the Q system precisely as α, but in the new system assumes a different value and function. The use of metaphors, analogies, symbolisms is only apparently a linguistic artifice. In fact, there is, far less epidermically, a comparative, meaningful and active characteristic of "free agreement” of the faculties, imagination and intellect. In this way the Adjacent Possible (even if only in its purely heuristic form) and reflective Judgment are the same thing.
The great theoretical innovation of the introduction of the Adjacent Possible concept is therefore to transform a Transcendental, or a function of the intellect such as that of reflective Judgment, in a biological function. Is therefore the reflective Judgment an "intellectualized stratagem" of the survival of the species? The ability to foresee and presuppose allows us to move in the horizon of meaning, formulating hypotheses and creating in time for the appropriate and further "reaction" to de facto discovery. In the cyclical interaction of predictions/confirms lies the actual knowledge.
In reconstructing the non-reducibility of biosphere evolution to purely physical laws, Kauffman reproduces, with different language and experience, the Kantian relationship between imagination and intellect. "This vast emergent becoming is beyond physics, yet based on it. This is life literally co- constructing itself and enabling its own vast evolutionary diversification.”25

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NOTES.

1 Immanuel Kant: “Kritik der Urteilskraft”, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1996 Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel. Trad. it. “Critica della facoltà di giudizio”, it. trans. E.Garroni e H.Hohenegger, Einaudi, Torino 1999.

2 see ivi, Introduction, ch. VI.

3 ivi, Introduction by E.G. pag. XLVI.

4 Judgement in general is described as “the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal”, and “if the universal is already given then the judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant” (K.d.U. Intr.IV). If, on the other hand, ˜only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective” (ibid.).

5 ""Transcendental is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1974 - A 12).

6 K.d.U. VI, pag. 23. 

7 ibid.

8 ibid.

9 see Emilio Garroni: Senso e paradosso, Laterza, Bari 1995. Id. ""Estetica ed epistemologia", Unicopli, Milano, 1998.

10 K.d.U. op.cit. cap. 68, capov. 6

11 E.Garroni, "Estetica ed epistemologia, op.cit. pag. 114.

12 Conway and Kochen, The Strong Free Will Theorem, published in Notices of the AMS. Volume 56, Number 2, Feb. 2009. See anche S.Kauffman: "Humanity in a creative universe" op.cit. OUP, pagg. 54 e segg.

13 ivi, pag. 230: "Our provocative ascription of free will to elementary particles is deliberate, since our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed, it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of our own."

14 Perhaps a greater clarity could be made if, conversely, an electron could change the observer's state. If the observer- observed system or link could be overturned. This should be possible in a system that presents homogeneous elements having the same functions. But it is not obviously the case of the electron-observer system.

15 It is interesting perhaps the parallel with the internal analogy created by the systematization of Aristotelian works by Andronicus of Rhodes. He places the works of Metaphysics "after" (μετὰ) the works of physics. To this day, this characteristic of succession has given the term "metaphysics" the meaning of a field beyond the physical - although Aristotle calls "the search for causes": "filosofia prima (first philosophy, so that comes first)".

16 This same article did not suppose all the possible developments of its motivations and presuppositions.

17 The Third Critique seeks precisely to clarify the relationship between freedom and finality.

18 see M. Heidegger, "Being and Time" (Italian version: Longanesi, Milan, 1970, p. 27). The discussion deepens in "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" Laterza, Bari, 1981. Conceived as the second part of Being and Time, the text is entirely devoted to Kant: "The purpose of “Critique of Pure Reason” is therefore fundamentally unknown, if this work is interpreted as "theory of experience" or even as a theory of positive sciences. The “Critique of pure reason” has nothing to do with a "theory of knowledge" (page 24). For Heidegger, Husserl's pupil, the luminal aspect of reality is only his relationship with the being of the entities. This is the only sense of his transcendence. The phenomenon is up-to-dateness, the noumenon, instead, the "sense" of this up-to-dateness. He quotes Opus Postumum Kantian: "The difference between the concepts of one thing in itself and one thing in the phenomenon is not objective, but simply subjective. The thing itself (“ens" for itself) is not another object, but another relation (“respectus") of representation to the same object. “ (Kant, Op. Post 1920 p. 653 C551)

19 In its present and powerful fertility, Husserl’s Phenomenology and its tradition have had a significant impact on contemporary scientific thinking, including its thematic appendage dedicated to the "Crisis" of the sciences.

20 Third Critique’s “sensus communis” could be a representation of an unprecedented community whose basic function is to "not exclude". It could be seen as a sort of transcendental condition that could implement the Adjacent Possible.

21 References to Stuart Kauffman's thoughts are in: Stuart Kauffman (1993) “The Origins of Order: Self Organization and Selection in Evolution”. Oxford University Press. id. (1995) “At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity”. Oxford University Press. id. (2000) “Investigations”. Oxford University Press. id. (2008) “Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science”, Reason, and Religion. Basic Books. id. (2016) “Humanity in a Creative Universe”. Oxford University Press.

22 S.K. “Humanity” op.cit. OUP, pag. 86 e segg.

23 S.K. “Mind, Body, Quantum Mechanics”, The Institute For Systems Biology, 2016: pag. 5: “Another example where new Actuals alter what is now Possible concerns “exaptations” in biological evolution. For example, swim bladders evolved from the lungs of lung fish and provided a new function, neutral buoyancy in the water column. But once the swim bladder exists as an Actual, it thereby creates, or “enables”, new adjacent possibilities in the evolution of the biosphere. For example a worm or a bacterial species could, by quantum random mutations and selection, evolve to live in the swim bladder once the bladder exists in the evolution of the biosphere, but not before. A change of actuals, here the swim bladder coming into existence, alters the truly possible new pathways of future biological evolution. 
More, natural selection presumably “acted’ to achieve a functioning swim bladder, but did not “act” such that the new swim bladder, by now existing, constituted a newly adjacent possible empty niche for the worm. Evolution progressively “becomes” into the very possibilities it itself create without selection “acting” to achieve these new possibilities. The same is true of technological evolution in the global economy. The advent of word processing did not cause, but enabled the newly adjacent possible of the modem, hence file sharing. Then the advent of the Web, and E-bay enabled selling on the Web. The global economy is “sucked into” the very possibilities it itself creates. These cases of biological and technological evolution suggest that these ever new possibilities are ontologically real and enabled by what is now actual. 
In both the J street store case, and the swim bladder, a changing actual changes what is now possible in further evolution, can do so instantaneously, and the “becoming possible” is a-causal.” 

24 Stuart Kauffman: "Beyond Physics: The Emergence And Evolution Of Life" The Institute For Systems Biology, Seattle March 29, 2017, Cern.

25 ibid. Then see S.K. "Humanity" op.cit. OUP, ch.2, part I

 

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